Case Study on D.I.a Baggage Handling System Essay

agree to the initial plan, the externalize was to span from 1989 to 1993 and cost $1.7 billion. The opening of the airport was delayed four times delinquent to problems with the luggage handling organisation. Over all in all 16 abundant months and a final cost of $4.5 billion. Several factors contri hardlyed to this fiasco, ranging from wanting(predicate) scheduling, simple and untested technology, involvedity of the arrangings and requirements that changed throughout the project itself. Let us take a encounter back at why capital of Colorado International aerodrome would take on such(prenominal) a project. The vision was to implement the largest automatize luggage handling system the world had seen and allows capital of Colorado International Airport to be hailed as the air transportation hub, the largest in the United States with a capacity to handle much than 50 million passengers annually.The airport was to replace the Stapleton International Airport, a facility that had experienced serious congestion issues. Of course in order to handle that kind of capacity part of this plan involved implementing an automated baggage handling system, this was the critical piece of the plan. This report discusses the difficulties encountered as a direct result of a poor project plan, communication and implementation. Analyses have been done by human beingy groups regarding this debacle and the failures itself atomic number 18 examples that are used to show the improper project management that was used.First, let us briefly discuss what try to be accomplished. The capital of Colorado International Airport wanted to introduce a baggage system that when practicable would rely on a network of computers (approx. 300) to route the bags and wherefore approximately 4000 auto-cars to drive the luggage on a 21-mile track, completely autonomous. There were to be laser scanners used to read bar codes on luggage with tags and that would route them to the correct ter minal or location. Sounds simple becoming merely BAE was the company that would try to put up this all to reality and would be one of the largest airports built in the United States since 1974.United Airlines was one of the important drivers and reasons for the push for a high-speed automated baggage system(http//www5.in.tum.de/huckle/schloh_DIA.pdf).This was all requested and graspd early in the supply phase. today previous to deciding how to proceed the officials had thought each airline business would develop its let systems, but this failed to occur so the Airport looked into purchasing a system to handle all terminals baggage. The eye socket of such a project would not find traditional methods as those were too investigated.A man named Frank Kwapniewski, would be the site project manager lucky equal to call this project his screw up. BAE had more than twenty some programmers working undistracted for two years to write software to handle all the automated needs of lu ggage, the engineers, which took average as long in their initial efforts of development. The initial architectural plans failures were inconsistency, so BAE sought to reduce such confusion and mishap, and wanted to understand the complex nature, however dismantle a more scrutinous view would have foreshadowed the mishap of making such a large system functionally.Richard de Neufville stated in an excerpt from his book that the theoretical studies, models and reports regarding the automated baggage system at Denver were avoidable and should never be repeated (Neufville). BAEs design flaws of complexity and the cause there subsequently were a result of improper project planning and scope. The complexity of what it would take to operate and control automated machinery was never addressed or fully tested prior to implementation. Even after work ended when it was dour on and expected to work as intended, Denver officials were surprised at how poor it performed compensate enough to turn off the system. Let us take a moment to look at how complex this system truly was and how BAE design and planning failed to gain a glimpse of what it would take to operate such a daunting task.An put down cart is called and needs to go from one track to another, albeit simple sounding, this shell of activity would have had to take place over a thousand times a bit under normal operating conditions. Since there were differences or variances in demand for empty carts throughout the airport, empty ones must continually switch direction, change tracks or completely change to another loop in the circuit. This is a logistics nightmare as one can imagine on such scale, so galore(postnominal) variables to account for and they must do it error stop. This was not using modern technology but even still it would have had to been al just about instant decision making on again an error free basis. Typical systems with around 10k function points are cancelled approximately 65 percent of the time (capers Jones). In Denver, though the systems workload hindered the network terribly to around 4000 tele-cars or auto-cars. These 1994 computers were tracking so many cars that several times a minute they mis-tracked just simply due to timing limitations.The planning of such a system was again pilot programly contracted by United in 1991 to build, however after several years into it, BAE was concerned that the city of Denver still had not contracted for a baggage system. Sadly, the baggage system was nothing more than an afterthought of the design of the airport, AFTER construction began, let me make sure you understand that AFTER construction had begun and only past did the details surrounding the baggage handling system start to begin. This of course caused major problems due to limitations of resources that were not allocated properly which would contain the baggage systems tracks and other components. The system then was made to fit in the underground tunnels and bil let available, not designed. These auto-carts had sharp turns outright to make which again was not part of any plan.The schedule that BAE or timetable rather that they had set for the grand opening was not remotely realistic and as all groovy projects should do, have taken into consideration any potential issues along the way. BAE officials were even quoted as stating We knew that was not long enough and we said so. It is a job that ought to take twice as long (Why Technology Projects Fail). They knew but accepted the timetable of 4 years when they knew it should take 7 to 8 years for such a task. Denver Aviation Director James C DeLong even stated they just misjudged the timeline completely. The project as most will when unrealistic deadlines are given will continue to fall behind more and more, which then calls for more rapid work, longer hours which can lead, as the case here, to human error since the training and interrogatory period were almost non-existent to meet the make- believe deadline. One of the other common misnomers in this project was the oftenness and number of changes to its requirements, not a refining of them, but completely adding new functionality along the way.When the company BAE, took on the task, unrealistic as this sounds they took it on with anticipating no changes at all. As soon as work began though, Denver officials began changing plans and timetables without consulting either the airlines or BAE. Sadly, when changes were made to one piece of the system, the ramifications they made to other pieces was not intelligibly understood or the system as a whole. Again to reduce costs and save time, it was determined to remove an entire loop of track, from one of the concourses, this saved them 20 million, keep that figure in promontory as later the system as a whole would cost them much more in the months after being deployed. Other such changes were made to save money, such as relocation of place and addition of middle sub floor for baggage platforms that they referred to as the mezzanine baggage platform.Another airline also demanded the request for large baggage link. As the project matured, prior to implementation its scope size of it and complexity, along with design changed which increased the systems difficulties on a technical level that would continually deter progress. BAE then later chooses to decentralize all of the tracking and sorting computers, all these changes to scope should have led to look into of alternate or contingency planning or delayed launch dates. However due to the bring down development and testing timetable, on the fly changes which should have required major pushback from core team members were duct-taped as I like to refer to it. One of the directors of engineering for the DIA, stated that BAE should have paid more financial aid to the programming issues early enough in the design phase.Lack of system testing, what I have I continuously stated all semester long about sys tem testing and end-user testing, as a project manager most would agree, more than 75% of all IS projects are hampered by quality issue and 1 percent which are completed on time. I see reasons behind such statistics is not enough testing. I would advise any IT PMP to read ePMbook which is an online e-book regarding scope and project control, as was the case here a project that started out to be huge, got even bigger and eventually spiraled out of control. The ePM Book will has an pure section that the BAE, airline and Denver City officials should have read prior to beginning step 2 of the project. They should have implemented any change coming through a request known now as a Change Request form. These forms are used to control the projects scope and allow for the Project Lead, along with the core team, which requests can and will be made part of the original project and which can be slated as close phase or next step after implementation.It almost sounds as if this project never had a Change Control Process (CCP) whatsoever, if it did whoever was in arraign of such did a horrible job, this CCP should exist throughout a project. It allows for requests to acknowledged in a by the bye fashion within a phase, and most important to determine impact in the planning for the next phase. This as stated on the site can be easier than de-railing the entire project due to trim down length of next step phases in the project path due to scope creep. Airlines kept changing the requirements, which resulted in numerous issues. One of the major reasons the whole thing went awry stems from BAE, the company that designed the system had previously implemented a similar system in Germany. The IT infrastructure was inadequate and design was not meant for such a large scale as that at the DIA.Well sadly it was not just a lesson for the DIA, BAE and Denver, but the taxpayers also ended up with a $1 million PER DAY cost, totaling $ergocalciferol million by the end of the whole or deal. Remember that 22 million they saved, good thing huh. Now let us think about how more time spent in analysis and design phase, let alone a Change control process, saved Colorado taxpayers millions of dollars. Since every project has a set of deliverables, assigned budget and expected closure time, there are agreed upon requirements and tasks to complete prior to the closure of a project. These constitute a projects scope. The PMBoK clearly speaks to creeping scope and defines it adding features and functionality without addressing the effects on TIME, COST, and RESOURCES or without customer approval (PMBOK Version 4).ReferencesA guide to the project management consistency of knowledge (PMBOK Guide) (4thed.).(2008). Newtown Square, Pa. Project guidance Institute.Brooks, F.P. (1995). The mythical man month Essays on software engineering.(Anniversary Ed.). Boston Addison Wesley Longman, Inc.JOHNSON, K. (2005, prideful 27). Denver Airport Saw the Future. It Didnt Work. NewYork Times. The New York Times Breaking password, World News & Multimedia.Fromhttp//www.nytimes.com/2005/08/27/national/27denver.html?pagewanted=allchloh_DIA.pdfNeufville, R., & Odoni, A. R. (2003). Airport systems planning design, andmanagement. New York McGraw-Hill.New Denver Airport impress of the Delayed Baggage System GAO/RCED-95-35BR.(n.d.). RITA National Transportation Library. Retrieved December 6, 2012,from http//ntl.bts.gov/DOCS/rc9535br.htmlScope & Change Control. (n.d.). Project Management and Program Management TheFREE ePMbook by Simon Wallace. Retrieved December 2, 2012, fromhttp//www.epmbook.com/scope.htmWiegers, K. (2003). Software Requirements (Second ed.). Redmond Microsoft Press.Why Technology Projects Fail. (n.d.). Calleam Consulting LLC. Retrieved December1, 2012, from http//www5.in.tum.de/huckle/DIABaggage.pdf